Job Security Laws and Structural Change in the Japanese Labor Market by Azetsu, Kenji & Fukushige, Mototsugu
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
Job Security Laws and Structural Change in 
the Japanese Labor Market 
 
Kenji AZETSU 
Mototsugu FUKUSHIGE 
 
Discussion Paper 05-31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2005 
 
 
この研究は「大学院経済学研究科・経済学部記念事業」 
基金より援助を受けた、記して感謝する。 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN 
 
Job Security Laws and Structural Change in 
the Japanese Labor Market 
 
Kenji AZETSU 
Mototsugu FUKUSHIGE 
 
Discussion Paper 05-31 
Job Security Laws and Structural Change in
the Japanese Labor Market∗
Kenji AZETSU
Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
Mototsugu FUKUSHIGE†
Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
November 2005
Abstract
There are a number of indications that Japanese job security laws
have been relaxed since the end of the 1990s. The purpose of this paper
is to establish causality between job security laws and firing costs in the
Japanese labor market. The analysis first investigates when and how
firing costs changed, and then compares the timing of these changes in
firing costs with those of job security laws. The results indicate that
gradual changes in firing costs began in about 1992, lagging one or two
years behind the bursting of the bubble economy, while job security
laws started to change towards the end of the 1990s.
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1 Introduction
When firms adjust their labor forces, they face adjustment costs (e.g., hiring
and firing costs), such that they need to dynamically determine their labor
demand.1 It is then important to understand the structure of adjustment
costs because these costs are critical in determining the pattern of labor
demand in response to environmental shocks. While hiring costs comprise
expenditure on advertising and the time spent on interviewing, testing and
so on, it is argued that firing costs depend more on institutional aspects, for
example, job security laws. This implies that a relaxation in job security laws
leads to lower firing costs. However, there are few studies that empirically
verify this effect. The purpose of this paper is then to investigate causality
between job security laws and firing costs.
Although the statute of employment security in Japan stipulates that
employers can freely discharge their employees, case law established after
the 1973 oil shock severely limits mass dismissal.2 Several cases established
four basic requirements that employers must meet before proceeding to dis-
miss workers: (a) the necessity of redundancy (i.e., the firm faces serious
administrative difficulties), (b) efforts at avoiding redundancy (e.g., reduc-
ing working hours, hiring freezing, and conversion of the work-place), (c) the
1See, for example, Nickell (1986).
2According to the Employment Protection Legislation Indicators in OECD (1999),
Japan has some of the severest job security laws.
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reasonableness of selection criteria, and(d) the reasonableness of the proce-
dure itself. Legal protection, of course, is not sufficient to provide protection
in itself, especially in the case of Japan where legal actions may take many
years to run through the courts and can be quite costly for the litigants.
In particular, workers in small, nonunionized firms are unlikely to believe
that they have much protection from the law. Nevertheless, there is a social
convention in Japan that a reduction in the number of workers should only
be used as a last resort.
Job security system as case laws is not clear in the aspect of the rule
of judgment but it is suitable for the changes in economic environments.
In actuality, several recent studies point out the possibility of changing job
security laws in Japan. Ohtake (2002), for example, quantitatively analyzes
the cases for redundancy, and argues that the job security laws changed from
the latter half of the 1990s. However, Inoue (2000) argues that there were
some cases that relaxed the criteria of unjust dismissal in 1999 and 2000.
Thus, we can consider cases since the end of 1990 as being indicators of the
relation of Japanese job security laws.
Although many studies on firms’ employment adjustment typically as-
sume that adjustment costs are symmetric, we assume an asymmetric form
to distinguish between hiring and firing costs, and focus on the changes in
firing costs. Jaramillo et al. (1993) and Phann and Palm (1993) propose
use of the Euler equation for a dynamic labor demand model that allows for
3
asymmetry between hiring and firing. In a more recent study, Azetsu and
Fukushige (2005) develop a dynamic labor demand model with asymmetric
adjustment costs for the number of workers and working hours. 3 In this
paper, we investigate the structural change of adjustment costs using the
model developed by Azetsu and Fukushige (2005). If structural changes in
adjustment costs occur, change may be gradual rather than more drastic.
We therefore allow the structure of adjustment costs to change gradually over
time with the gradual switching model proposed by Ohtani and Katayama
(1985) and Ohtani et al. (1990). This model can detect when the change
in firing costs starts and allows the causality between firing costs and job
security laws to be established.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we develop
the dynamic model of labor demand that is the basis of our empirical work.
In section 3, we describe the data used, the empirical specification and the
results. In section 4 we discuss the implications of the result and conclude
the paper.
3Goux et al. (2001) assume that the labor force is the sum of permanent and fixed-term
workers, which implies that the marginal productivities of the two types are equivalent.
Therefore, the estimable Euler equation can be derived without specifying the production
function. Azetsu and Fukushige (2005) derive the Euler equation without specifying the
production function. This differs from Goux et al. (2001) where the labor force is the
product of working hours per worker and the number of workers.
4
2 The Model
Our analysis follows the model developed by Azetsu and Fukushige (2005),
which derives and estimates the Euler equation for working hours and the
number of workers without specifying the production function. This is of
some benefit because it is usually difficult to estimate production functions,
especially the aggregate level (e.g., specification problems with functional
form and technical progress, measurement problems with physical capital).
We start by assuming the form of technology. Let Ht and Nt de-
note, respectively, working hours per worker and the number of workers
that a representative firm hires. Thus, HtNt is the firm’s effective labor
force. We assume that the firm has a production function f(HtNt, ²t), with
∂f(HtNt, ²t)/∂(HtNt) > 0 and ∂2f(HtNt, ²t)/∂(HtNt)2 < 0. The term ²t
represents a productivity shock observed at the beginning of period t. Also,
we assume that the adjustment costs for the number of workers and working
hours are quadratic and asymmetric. The nondifferentiability of adjustment
costs causes a discontinuity in the firm’s decision rule. For example, Hamer-
mesh (1989) argues that labor demand has lumpy or linear adjustment costs
at the individual plant level, but continuous costs at the aggregate level.
Since we use macro data in this analysis, the discontinuity in labor demand
can be ignored.4
4Hildreth and Ohtake (1998) examines the discreteness of labor demand using data
provided by Japanese companies.
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The risk-neutral representative firm adjusts working hours and the num-
ber of workers, after the realized current shock is observed, in order to max-
imize the present discounted value of expected profits, V , over an infinite
horizon. The firm’s optimization problem is as follows:
V (Ht−1, Nt−1) = max
it,rt,at,st
F (HtNt, ²t)− wtHtNt − cI2 i
2
t −
cD
2
d2t
−cA
2
a2t −
cS
2
s2t + δEt[V (Ht, Nt)],(1)
subject to Ht −Ht−1 = it − dt, (2)
Nt −Nt−1 = at − st, (3)
Ht, Nt, it, rt, at, st ≥ 0, (4)
where Et denotes expectations at the end of period t. at, st, it, and dt, re-
spectively, represent hiring workers, firing workers, increasing working hours,
and reducing working hours. The parameter δ is a discount factor and wt is
the wage per working hour.
Solving this problem yields the following Euler equations for working
hours and the number of workers, respectively:
MtNt − (cIit − cDdt) + δEt[cIit+1 − cDdt+1] = 0, (5)
MtHt − (cAat − cSst) + δEt[cAat+1 − cSst+1] = 0, (6)
where Mt ≡ F ′(t)−wt. When both cI and cD (cA and cS) are positive, the
firm will not choose both it and dt (at and st) to be positive.
Each condition (5) and (6) means that the optimal decision is such that
the current marginal return to adjustment of working hours (of the num-
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ber of workers) is equal to the discounted expected marginal cost for the
adjustment itself.
The Euler equations (5) and (6) can be combined to yield:
Et
[
(aˆt − sˆt)− α(aˆt + sˆt)− βiˆt + γdˆt
]
= 0, (7)
where aˆt ≡ (at − δat+1)/Ht, sˆt ≡ (st − δst+1)/Ht, iˆt ≡ (it − δit+1)/Nt,
dˆt ≡ (dt − δdt+1)/Nt. The α ≡ (cS − cA)/2cN , where cN = (cS + cA)/2,
measures the asymmetry between the costs of hiring and firing workers. Both
cA and cS are positive, if and only if −1 < α < 1 is satisfied. If α is positive
(negative), then the adjustment costs for firing workers are relatively larger
(smaller) than that for hiring. α = 0 implies that the adjustment costs
for workers are symmetric. The parameters, β ≡ cI/cN and γ ≡ cD/cN ,
measure the relative costs of adjusting working hours to costs for adjusting
the number of workers. The model cannot be rejected if the estimated
parameters satisfied the sign conditions; −1 < α < 1, β, γ > 0.
3 Data and Econometric Estimation
We use seasonally unadjusted monthly data for the Japanese labor market
from 1986 to 2004, as reported in the Monthly Labour Survey by the Min-
istry of Health, Labour and Welfare. We use indices of working hours, Ht,
and the number of workers, Nt, both normalized to 100 in 2000. The terms
it and dt represent the net flow of working hours, Ht. The variables at and
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st are represented by the numbers of acquisitions and separations. In gen-
eral, the words “dismissal” or “firing” are defined as one-sided cancellation
employment contracts by the firm. We use “dismissal” or “firing” when the
firm reduces the number of workers. Although early retirement is argued to
be voluntary, it is often the case that the company puts heavy pressure on
unwanted employees to leave the firm. In this sense, we can regard much
voluntary early requirement as “dismissal” or “firing”.
In order to estimate the model, the realized values of period t + 1 are
substituted for unobserved expectations of it+1, dt+1, at+1, st+1, and the
disturbances u1t and u2t are added to (5) and (6), respectively. We obtain
the following:
MtNt − (cIit − cDdt) + δ(cIit+1 − cDdt+1) = u1t, (8)
MtHt − (cAat − cSst) + δ(cAat+1 − cSst+1) = u2t. (9)
This specification leads (7) to the following equation:
(aˆt − sˆt)− α(aˆt + sˆt)− βiˆt + γdˆt = vt, (10)
where vt = u1t/Nt − u2t/Ht. Since we use aggregate data, the disturbances
u1t and u2t may be serially correlated, and furthermore, u1t/Nt and u2t/Ht,
divided by Nt and Ht, may be heteroskedastic. Accordingly, the composite
disturbance vt can exhibit both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. We
now assume the composite disturbance vt = µt + µ¯, where µt is an MA(n)
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process with heteroskedasticity disturbances and µ¯ is constant. 5 We assume
the order of the MA process to be n = 23.
We allow the parameters, which represent the structure of the adjust-
ment costs, to gradually change over time as unexpected change, such that
the parameters are specified as follows:
αt = α0 + λtα1, βt = β0 + λtβ1, γt = γ0 + λtγ1, µ¯t = µ¯0 + λtµ¯1,
where λt is a transition function that accounts for a change from α0, β0, γ0
to α0+α1, β0+ β1, γ0+ γ1, over time. The transition function is formed as
follows:
λt = 0 for t=1, 2, . . . , ts − 1
= (t− ts)/(te − ts) for t=ts, . . . , te − 1
= 1 for t=te, . . . , T ,
where ts, te represent a start-point and end-point of the gradual shift to be
estimated.
In order to allow for endogeneity of the regressors, we estimate the equa-
tion (10) using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique de-
veloped by Hansen (1982), and employ Newey and West’s (1987) weight
5Since the composite disturbance exhibits serial correlation and heteroskedasticity,
E[vt] may not be zero, even though E[u1t] and E[u2t] are zero.
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matrix. The following variable terms serve as instrumental variables:
1, λt, aˆt−lag − sˆt−lag, aˆt−lag + sˆt−lag, iˆt−lag, dˆt−lag,
λt−lag(aˆt−lag − sˆt−lag), λt−lag(aˆt−lag + sˆt−lag), λt−lag iˆt−lag, λt−lagdˆt−lag.
Lag indicates the number of lags used for a variable, based on monthly data.
For example, if lag = 1, the variable xt−1 is used, whereas xt−1 and xt−2
are used if lag = 1, 2. To allow for the autocorrelation of disturbances in
the form of the 23rd-order moving average, the instruments must be lagged
at least 24 periods.
Table 1 shows the GMM estimation result for equation (10). A chi-square
test (sometimes called the J-test) is used to test the overidentifying restric-
tions of the model. In the estimation process, the start-point and end-point
of the gradual switching, ts, te, are simultaneously selected as maximizing
the Wald statistics, which test the null hypothesis that no parameters have
changed. As shown in Table 1, γ1 and µ¯1 are not significant, which implies
that there is no structural change in γ and µ¯. Table 2 shows the result for
the same equation excluding the parameters γ1 and µ¯1. By comparing the
results in both Table 1 and Table 2, we confirm the robustness of the pa-
rameters excluding γ1 and µ¯1. Hereafter, we focus on the results presented
in Table 2.
To start with, we check whether the model of labor demand in section
2 can be rejected. For each parameter, the following condition must be
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satisfied:
asymmetry of adjustment costs for workers − 1 < α < 1,
relative adjustment costs for working hours β > 0, γ > 0.
The estimated parameters satisfy the sign conditions in every case. To be
more specific, before the structural change the estimated α range was from
0.481 to 0.491, and after the structural change from 0.235 to 0.274. All of
these are significantly positive and less than 1. The estimated β before the
change range was between 0.016 and 0.017; following, between 0.028 and
0.030. The estimated γ is 0.009. All of these parameters are significantly
positive and satisfy the sign conditions.
Next, we analyze the results for the estimated structure of adjustment
costs and the timing of structural change. The significance of α1 and β1 sug-
gests that structural change in the adjustment costs for labor has occurred.
The start-point of the structural change selected is from Sep. 1991 to Apr.
1992. The end-point of the change is selected from Sep. 2001 to Jan. 2002.6
These results suggest that adjustment costs started to change within one or
two years of the bubble burst, and continued to change for nearly 10 years.
The estimated α is about 0.5 before the structural change, and falls to
0.25 after the change. All of these are significantly positive. This implies
6When we use the instrument lag = 24,25,26 the selected end-point of the structural
change is May 1998. Since this result differs from those with instrument lag = 24,25 and
lag = 24,25,26,27, we ignore the results.
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that the costs of adjusting the number of workers are asymmetric, with firing
costs exceeding hiring costs. The relative costs of increasing working hours
to adjusting the number of workers, β, is estimated to be about 0.015: it is
much less costly to adjust working hours than the number of workers. After
the change, β rises to 0.03. This means that the relative costs of increasing
working hours increase significantly. On the other hand, the relative costs
of decreasing working hours, γ, is not significantly zero, but is very small.
Structural change in γ is not detected.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The results of this analysis indicate that structural change gradually took
place between 1992 and 2001. We also obtained the estimated parameters
before and after the structural change. The measure of asymmetry between
the costs for hiring and firing fell, that is, firing costs became large relative
to hiring costs. The relative costs of increased working hours and decreasing
rose and were unchanged, respectively. For the purposes of this paper, we
investigated change in firing costs, not the change in asymmetry between
the costs for hiring and firing. Figure 1 shows the change of the parameter
cS , cN with setting cA = 1. We can see that firing costs cS have decreased,
with hiring costs normally taken to be expenditure on advertising and time
spent on interviewing, testing, training new workers, etc. Of course, in a
recession, the labor market is more relaxed such that the firms’ costs of
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searching for new workers could become relatively cheaper when compared
to, say, a boom. However, screening costs could also rise because firms select
new workers more carefully. It is then natural to believe that hiring costs do
not change, regardless of business performance. Figure 2 shows the change
of the parameters cI and cD. The costs of increasing working hours cI rose,
and the costs for decreasing working hours cD fell.
In this paper we used aggregate data, which does not separate regular
from part-time workers. The amount of employed part-time workers in-
creased on average by 4.63% per year from 1994 to 2001, while the number
of regular workers decreased by 0.39%. In general, the cost of adjusting
part-time workers is smaller than the cost for regular workers. It is there-
fore possible that a recent increase in the ratio of part-time workers to total
workers affects the structure of adjustment costs. Figure 3 shows the ratio of
part-time workers to total workers, reported in the Monthly Labour Survey
by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. This only started to rise
around 1998, while structural change started around 1991. Therefore, the
increase in the ratio of part-time workers to total workers has not been the
only cause of structural change.
Now, we reach a stage where it is possible to argue that firing costs have
gradually fallen since the bubble burst.7 Why then did firing costs start
7The costs for increasing working hours have increased and those for decreasing working
hours have fallen. In fact, a reduction in working hours has been encouraged since a revised
government ordinance from January 1994. In 1986, legal working hours went to 40 hours
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to fall from about 1992? As already noted in section 1, there were several
cases that caused the criterion of unjust redundancy to be relaxed towards
the end of the 1990s. This implies that firing costs had fallen gradually,
without relaxing job security laws. With the exception of job security laws,
bargaining power and the social consensus for firms’ reduction of workers
establish firing costs. Since almost all workers employed by small, nonunion-
ized firms cannot pay the court costs, they are not directly protected by job
security laws. But they are, however, protected by the social regulation
governing the reduction of workers. When firms reduce the number of their
workers, they stand to lose their reputations and to be strongly opposed
by trade unions. If the firms obtain a social consensus for the reduction of
workers, the costs for reducing workers could be lower. After the bubble
burst in 1991, social sympathy for the firms’ reduction of workers occurred
because of worsening economic performance. We can then understand that
relaxation of the social regulation governing firms’ reduction of workers led
to lower firing costs. Thus, our results are consistent with those of Suruga
(1997), who found, using firm micro-level data, a positive correlation be-
tween firing and a firm’s administrative trouble. Suruga (1997) also argues
that a firm could seek and obtain sympathy for the firm’s reduction of work-
ers, and avoid conflict with workers and trade unions, if the firm has serious
a week from 48 hours a week, taking effect after 1994. This could lead to rising costs for
increasing working hours and falling costs for decreasing working hours.
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administrative problems.
Following the Second World War, there were many dismissal conflicts
between employees and employers. Workers furiously resisted collective dis-
missals, so firing costs gradually increased. Severe job security laws were
enacted in 1980s and 1990s after the first oil shock in 1973. After the bub-
ble burst in the beginning of the 1990s, Japan suffered from a prolonged
period of economic stagnation. During this period, firms could gain the
acceptance of workers for reducing the number of workers, such that firing
costs began to gradually decrease. Job security laws also started to relax,
but lagging the reduction in firing costs.
This analysis shows that firing costs had started to fall one or two years
after the bubble burst, and continued to fall for nearly 10 years, while job
security laws started to change at the end of the 1990s. We conclude that
firing costs in the Japanese labor market can change to suit the economic
environment, because change in the social consensus as regards firms that
reduce the number of workers corresponds to the economic environment. We
also find that job security laws follow change in the social consensus when
such change is quite large.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we solve the optimization problem of the text, and derive
the estimation equation (7). First, we define W as follows:
W = F (HtNt, ²t)− wtHtNt − cI2 i
2
t −
cD
2
d2t −
cA
2
a2t −
cS
2
s2t + δEt[V (Ht, Nt)].
The problem of the text is maximizing W for it, dt, at, st under the con-
straints; transition equations (2) and (3), and the Nonnegativity restrictions
(4). That is:
V (Ht−1, Nt−1) = max
it,dt,at,st
W, (11)
subject to Ht −Ht−1 = it − dt, (12)
Nt −Nt−1 = at − st, (13)
Ht, Nt, it, dt, at, st ≥ 0, (14)
Differentiating W with respect to each variable, taking account of (12) and
(13), we have:
∂W
∂it
= MtNt − cIit + δEt
[
∂V (Ht, Nt)
∂Ht
]
, (15)
∂W
∂dt
= −MtNt − cDdt − δEt
[
∂V (Ht, Nt)
∂Ht
]
, (16)
∂W
∂at
= MtHt − cAat + δEt
[
∂V (Ht, Nt)
∂Nt
]
, (17)
∂W
∂st
= −MtHt − cSst − δEt
[
∂V (Ht, Nt)
∂Nt
]
, (18)
where Mt ≡ ∂F (HtNt, ²t)/∂(HtNt) − wt. The Kuhn–Tucker conditions are
∂W/∂i ≤ 0, ∂W/∂d ≤ 0, ∂W/∂a ≤ 0, ∂W/∂s ≤ 0, with the complementary-
slackness proviso that i(∂W/∂i) = 0, d(∂W/∂d) = 0, a(∂W/∂a) = 0,
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s(∂W/∂s) = 0, respectively. When all adjustment cost parameters cI , cR,
cA, cS are strictly positive, the firm never chooses both it and dt positive,
and neither at nor st. But, if one of cI and cD (cA and cS) is negative, the
firm may choose both it and dt (at and st) positive.
By differentiating both sides of (11) with respect to Ht−1 and Nt−1, we
have the following:
∂V (Ht−1, Nt−1)
∂Ht−1
=MtNt + δEt
[
∂V (Ht, Nt)
∂Ht
]
, (19)
∂V (Ht−1, Nt−1)
∂Nt−1
=MtHt + δEt
[
∂V (Ht, Nt)
∂Nt
]
. (20)
Using the above Kuhn–Tucker conditions and (19), (20), we can derive
the following Euler equations for working hours and for the number of work-
ers:
Et[MtNt − {cIit − cDdt}+ δ{cIit+1 − cDdt+1}] = 0, (21)
Et[MtHt − {cAat − cSst}+ δ{cAat+1 − cSst+1}] = 0. (22)
Dividing (21) and (22) by Nt, Ht respectively, the above Euler equations
are:
Et[Mt − cI iˆt + cDdˆt] = 0, (23)
Et[Mt − cAaˆt + cS sˆt] = 0, (24)
where aˆt ≡ (at − δat+1)/Ht, sˆt ≡ (st − δst+1)/Ht, iˆt ≡ (it − δit+1)/Nt,
dˆt ≡ (dt − δdt+1)/Nt.
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Combining the two equations (23) and (24)as follows:
Et
[
(aˆt − sˆt)− cS − cA2cN (aˆt + sˆt)−
cI
cN
iˆt +
cD
cN
dˆt
]
= 0, (25)
where cN = (cS + cA)/2.
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 24 
Fig. 1. The transition of CA, CS, CN  
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Fig. 2. The transition of CI, CD 
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Fig. 3. The ratio of part-time workers to total workers 
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